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TAKE THE MONEY AND RUN: INHERENT ETHICAL
PROBLEMS OF THE CONTINGENCY FEE
AND LOSER PAYS SYSTEMS
PHILIP J. HItAVERS*
On December 11, 1998, dozens of lawyers who represented
the first states to settle with the tobacco industry over health care
costs were awarded $8.2 billion in legal fees, the richest legal pay-
day in the nation's history.' The payout is the result of a $34.4
billion settlement reached by lawyers who represented Florida,
Mississippi and Texas and "is the first to result from a series of
tobacco cases that culminated last month in a $206 billion settle-
ment between tobacco companies and 46 states and five United
States territories. '2 A more extensive settlement which did not
include those three states will probably produce billions more for
plaintiffs' lawyers. 3 Although the arbitration panel awarding the
$8.2 billion in legal fees4 awarded far less than the lawyers had
claimed, the panel "gave the lawyers credit for taking the risks of
being first to test the legal strategy of suing the tobacco industry
to recover Medicaid costs related to smoking."5
In the months prior to the awarding of these legal fees, a
public debate was sparked as to the proper amount which should
be awarded to the attorneys. On one side are those who believe
that billions of dollars, being such a huge sum, is an unjustifiable
amount to pay any attorney regardless of the amount of the set-
tlement: when calculated, the hourly amounts equal thousands
of dollars per hour. On the other side of the debate are those
who agree with the arbitration panel that the lawyers should be
rewarded for taking on such an uncertain and complex case
* Philip Havers is currently a third-year law student at Notre Dame Law
School. He is a White Scholar and Executive Editor for Notre Dame Journal of
Law, Ethics & Public Policy.
1. See Barry Meier, Lawyers in Tobacco Case Will Receive $8.2 Billion, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1998, at Al.
2. Id.
3. See id. For more on this settlement, see Eric Fettmann, The War on Big
Tobacco: It Was Money All Along, N.Y. PosT,Jan. 17,1999, at 59; Meier, supra note
1; Mark Silva, State's Tobacco-Suit's Lawyers Awarded More than $3.4 Billion in Fees,
MiAMI HERALD, Dec. 12, 1998, at 1A.
4. See Meier, supra note 1. Originally, five of the attorneys had sought $25
billion for negotiating the states' $17 billion dollar settlement.
5. Id.
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which required hours of time and a high level of expertise and
skill. Noting the amount of time required as well as the fact that
cases brought against the tobacco companies in the past had
almost always failed, these supporters claim such a high level of
return for the attorneys was justified, regardless of the amount of
the hourly rate.
Such views over the tobacco litigation have rekindled the
debate about whether the legal system should revise its legal fees;
the current contingency fee system, many claim, is unworkable
and subject to abuse, frivolous lawsuits, and unjustifiably high
payouts to attorneys. This debate over legal fees, however, is not
new. "In pre-revolutionary times, the young British colonies
actually followed the English Rule of loser pays."6 However,
unlike the pure English version, the authorities strictly regulated
the maximum amount of legal fees an attorney could charge.7
After the American Revolution, opposition to government regu-
lation resulted in a variety of individual states repealing the caps
on attorneys' fees.8 As the nineteenth century ended, most
courts followed this latter view and denied attorneys' fees in
awards for damages.9
At the turn of the century, each side was required to pay its
own attorneys' fees."° However, this hourly billing method was
seen by many as a mechanism by which the rich were able to file
suits and seek redress in the court system, while the poor and
middle classes were not as they simply could not afford to file the
suits. This became increasingly evident as the price of legal fees
rose to the point where many of the middle class were feeling the
economic restraints on legal representation previously felt only
by the poor. As a result, a system of contingency fee billing
began to be used.'" Under this system, the client was only billed,
usually at a higher rate than under the hourly system, if the client
won the case. The client then paid the attorney a percentage of
the recovered judgment. This system is currently used, not only
in risky litigation where it developed originally, but also in low
6. Charles W. Branham III, It Couldn't Happen Here: The English Rule-But
Not In South Carolina, 49 S.C. L. REv. 971, 975 (1998).
7. See id. See also Susanne Di Pietro & Teresa W. Cams, Alaska's English
Rule: Attorney's Fee Shifiingin Civil Cases, 13 AtLAsA L. REv. 33, 37 (1996) (noting
that colonial statutes regulated recoverable fees from a defeated adversary and
from the attorney's client).
8. See Branham, supra note 6, at 975.
9. See id.; see also Di Pietro & Cams, supra note 7, at 37.
10. See Branham, supra note 6, at 975.
11. See generally Stevens v. Sheriff, 90 P. 799 (Kan. 1907); Miles v. Chey-
enne, 148 N.W. 959 (Neb. 1914).
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risk litigation cases and is beginning to be seen in transactional
law.
A number of ethical questions have plagued the contingency
fee system since its inception: Does such a system create the
incentives to file frivolous lawsuits? Does the system change the
fiduciary relationship between attorney and client? Is the contin-
gency fee appropriate for cases involving no or little risk? Is the
contingency fee based on a relatively large percentage of the
final judgment appropriate in the context of the modern mega-
judgments such as the ongoing Tobacco litigation? Moreover, if
these latter two questions are answered in the negative, is it
appropriate for the courts to interfere with the relationship
between the attorney and client vis a vis the setting of legal fees?
If the client is fully knowledgeable of the agreement's conse-
quences, should the effects of the agreement felt by client even
be an issue for the courts to address?
In contrast to the American contingency fee system is the
English "Loser Pays system."' 2 Under this system, the loser of a
suit pays all of the legal costs for both sides, although typically,
the loser's attorney will not actually insist on collecting his or her
own fee. 13 Consequently, this makes litigation extremely risky
and expensive. As a result, those with less money run the greater
risk in any suit and, consequently, many do not see the legal sys-
tem as a viable means of redress, given the risk of losing and its
consequences.
This paper will examine the ethical challenges faced by two
competing systems of billing clients: the American contingency
fee system and the English rule, "Loser Pays" system. I will
examine the advantages and disadvantages to each system and
balance these factors to determine if one is preferable to the
other. Finally, I will propose a new system which accounts for the
ethical problems faced by both systems.
This article is not concerned with blatantly frivolous suits
which are already dismissed for failure to state a claim. 14 The
suits dismissed under Rule 12(b) (6) fall under two categories:
those with valid claims, but with some procedural discrepancy
which prevents the case from being heard, and those cases which
on their face are meritless. This second type of lawsuit is rela-
tively rare and because these suits are dismissed, their frivolous
12. See HERBERT KRITZER, THE ENGLISH EXPERIENCE WITH THE ENGLISH
RULE: How "LOSER PAYS" WORKS, WHAT DIFFERENCE IT MAKES, AND WHAT
MIGHT HAPPEN HERE (1992).
13. See id. at 3.
14. See FED. R. COv. P. 12(b)(6).
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nature is already being properly addressed. However, these cases
are relatively rare as the courts are loathe to dismiss a case out of
hand without going through discovery. Because this bar for dis-
missal is so high at this point in the proceedings, many cases
which, after discovery, turn out to be frivolous, clear this hurdle.
These frivolous cases, having some small grounding in fact which
allows them to proceed, are the cases that most concern the fee
reformers. These cases are precisely those that some attorneys
use to force settlement in order to obtain the high fees associated
with the contingency system. Under the contingency fee system,
a frivolous case may be settled by the institutional defendant sim-
ply because of the other costs involved. Such costs include nega-
tive publicity; insurance companies balking at covering
companies which are high risks for litigation; and the desire to
simply put the hassle of a suit behind them. Consequently, any
viable fee system must address and discourage these types of law-
suits before they even get to the settlement stage.
I. CONTINGENCY FEES
The contingency fee system was created to ensure that those
with valid claims, but who were unable to pay the costs associated
with filing and litigating those claims, have access to counsel and
the courts. 5 Typically, these contingency suits involved an indi-
vidual plaintiff and an institutional defendant; the theory being
that the individual plaintiff, when faced with a formidable oppo-
nent who is used to dealing with suits, would otherwise be left
without recourse because he or she is first bankrupted before the
suit reaches a conclusion. Moreover, under a normal hourly fee
system, the plaintiff was typically liable for his own attorney's fees,
regardless of the outcome of the suit. Consequently, the risk of
losing often prevented those from filing claims which are merito-
rious, but not guaranteed winners. Under the contingency fee
system, the losing plaintiff is no longer required to pay the attor-
ney a fee, thus making the filing of a suit much more palatable.
However, because of the very real risk of not being paid in the
event that the plaintiff lost, should the plaintiff win, his attorney
is entitled to a larger percentage of the judgment (usually one-
third for pretrial settlement, forty percent if it goes to trial and
15. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-20 5-7 (1980).
See also LESTER BRICIKiAN ET AL., RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES 13 (1994) (not-
ing that contingency fees ensure that many accident victims can have access to
the courts which they would otherwise be unable to afford).
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up to fifty percent if appeals are required)16 than he would be
under a normal hourly fee system.
The Ethics of the Contingency Fee System
Human nature being what it is and, contrary to popular
opinion, lawyers being humans, when opportunity rears its head
in the form of large financial gains, many lawyers will abandon
their principles of professionalism and seek out those gains,
often at the expense of their client's interests. Although lawyers
claim to believe that the law is a profession unlike any other, with
an imbedded sense of ethics and values and that lawyers must
always promote justice over our individual client's needs,17 the
structure of the system is far removed from this ideal. This is
most fundamentally seen in the contingency fee system. Because
the system gives the attorney a personal stake in the outcome of
the case, the attorney is faced with some very difficult decisions:
he may either hold true to his ideals of law as a profession which
promotes justice or act as if it is simply a job like any other from
which to derive income. Unfortunately, the contingency fee sys-
tem fosters the latter view. Individual attorneys or firms cannot
afford to take on cases to promote 'justice" when a truly just out-
come may be adverse not only to their client, but to themselves.
Moreover, because the costs of litigation, borne by the attorney
until he recovers the contingency fee, are so high, such an
adverse outcome is intolerable and possibly ruinous.18
Because of this large personal financial stake, the attorney
can no longer look upon his practice of law as one devoted pri-
marily to justice. Besides calling into question this basis of our
professional rules that he is now more likely to ignore or, at the
least, will play with at the margins, the negative aspects of the
contingency system work their way into the sacred relationship
between the attorney and client. In making the attorney's fees
dependent on winning the case, the system has given the lawyer a
strong financial interest in the claim and, as such, the attorney
has become almost a separate party in the litigation with his own
interests and motivations. 9 As the lawyer invests more time and
money, his personal stake in the outcome of the case increases2 °
16. See BRICKMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 13.
17. See EARL WOOD, FEE CONTRACTS FOR LAWYERS 12 (1936).
18. For an example of the financial risks run by attorneys in contingency
fee cases, see JONATHAN HARR, A CIVIL AcriON (1995).
19. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL ETHICS 228 (1985).
20. See FREDERICK BENJAMIN MACKINNON, CONTINGENT FEES FOR LEGAL
SERVICES 196 (1964).
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and the more the lawyer's incentives begin to change.21 Rather
than seeking a just settlement for the client which adequately
compensates the client for his injuries, the attorney must also
account for the increasing costs and effort expended as the suit
goes forward. Consequently, if the defendant is willing to settle
early in the process, the plaintiffs attorney may be more willing
to settle for a lower amount as he has not expended as much
time, energy and expertise as he would subsequently. However,
should the defendant only attempt settlement later in the pro-
cess, the plaintiffs attorney is less likely to accept the amount
offered even if it may have been adequate earlier. Although the
client is supposed to make the decisions whether to settle and for
how much, the reality is that it is usually the attorney who decides
such issues.2 2 An argument can be made that such control is
beneficial to the client as the attorney is more likely to push for
higher settlement offers, which, in turn, increases the client's net
amount recovered. However, this tactic can backfire, leading the
defendant to refuse negotiations and to insist on the case going
to trial where the plaintiff runs the substantial risk of losing or of
getting a lower amount than that offered.
Additionally, the contingency fee system often negatively
affects the attorney-client relationship as the plaintiff/client
often ends up receiving a smaller percentage than he originally
anticipated. Because contingency fee agreements are often com-
plicated, involving fee structures based on the various stages of
the proceedings23 and separating costs from fees, the client is
often not fully aware of the effects of the contingency fee agree-
ment on his judgment. In many cases, the attorney receives not
only one-third of the damages, but also a substantial amount for
legal costs.2 4 The net effect of this combined amount for the
attorney is that the plaintiff receives only about fifty-percent of
the total damages recovered; an amount not properly under-
stood by most plaintiffs when entering into the agreement with
the attorney. Although technically attorneys are supposed to dis-
close this information and ensure that their clients understand
the ramifications of these agreements, historically such a rule has
been difficult to enforce.
21. See SHAFFER, supra note 19, at 228.
22. See id.
23. See BICK.MAN ET Ai., supra note 15, at 13; JOHN SRaEBY, LET'S TALK
MONEY 46 (1987) (describing contingency fee agreements as well as more com-
plex, but just as common, hybrid agreements combining hourly and contin-
gency fees); WOOD, supra note 17, 304-12.
24. See WooD, supra note 17, at 173. See also Edward Rosenthal, Fee Cap
May Not Deter Malpractice Suits, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 1993, at B1.
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This consequently destroys the attorney-client relationship
between individual attorneys and clients, in addition to breeding
a level of general distrust for the profession as a whole. Such a
result is disastrous for the legal profession since our very liveli-
hood depends on a solid reputation and the need for complete
candor between attorney and client. If the client feels they can-
not trust the attorney, either from bad experiences with other
attorneys or because they understand the personal stake the
attorney has in the fee system and consequently is wary of the
attorney's motives when he proposes a certain cause of action or
settlement, the entire system collapses.
Related to the issue of changing the profession from one
concerned with justice to one used purely to gain financially, is
the problem that the contingency fee system has bred a particu-
lar type of attorney and a particular type of client who now view
the contingency system as a mechanism for high, relatively easy
returns. Plaintiffs, "who would not think of entering on a lawsuit,
if they knew they must compensate their lawyer whether they win
or lose, are ready upon a contingency agreement to try their
chances with any kind of claims. It makes the law more of a lot-
tery than it is."25 Additionally, because of the thirty-percent or
more obtainable through the contingency fee system, these attor-
neys file frivolous lawsuits in the hopes of obtaining an early
settlement.
Although the courts and A.B.A.26 have attempted to curb
these lawsuits through Rule 1127 sanctions and by forcing the los-
ing side in these frivolous cases to pay the innocent party's court
costs,2" many defendants find it more cost effective for them to
settle the case rather than seek dismissal or litigate the merits.
Just as with a growing mistrust between lawyer and client, this is
also encouraging a growing mistrust between lawyers. No longer
are lawyers in a suit viewed with professional respect as oppo-
nents seeking a just end to the case. Instead, lawyers in many
contingency cases often end up personally disliking the other
side. Moreover, in the profession generally, an animosity has
25. SHAFFER, supra note 19, at 228.
26. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1995).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. For further discussion of Rule 11, see Cooter &
Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 393 (1990) (noting that Rule lI's "cen-
tral purpose is to deter baseless filings"); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L.
Rubenfeld, Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An Economic Analysis, 82 GEO. L.J. 397
(1993); William W. Shwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARv. L. Ruv. 1013 (1988).
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1988). See also, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980); Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1 (1973). Both cases hold
that if a party engages in bad faith litigation, the bad faith exception entities the
opposing party to an award of attorney's fees from the abusing party.
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grown up where typically corporate defense attorneys have very
little respect for the contingency plaintiffs' lawyers as they view
them as money-grubbing sharks,29 and the plaintiffs lawyers view
corporate defense attorneys as mere extensions of the defendant
corporate machine. Consequently, the discovery process has
grown increasingly hostile and complex with both sides never
completely trusting the other to divulge all of the required
documents.
In addition to these interactive problems, we are increas-
ingly seeing high contingency rates for cases where the outcome
is not really in any doubt"° or where the amount paid to the
attorney is obscenely high for the amount of work actually
done.' This is due, in part, to the increase of class actions in
32recent years. Although fees in class actions are fixed by the
courts,3 3 the success and high profiles of class actions in recent
years have encouraged other types of complex cases with multi-
ple plaintiffs, but which are not technically class actions and thus
not subject to the rates set by the courts.
For example, the courts have recently been swamped with
asbestos litigation, each case involving multiple plaintiffs and
defendants.34 Although these types of suits involve a level of
expertise not required in many non-complex suits and could jus-
tify a higher payout than the average tort suit, the incredibly high
payouts to the lawyers are hard to justify. Part of this problem
29. In interviews with several partners at top Chicago firms specializing in
defending corporations, these attorneys recognized that some suits were mei-
torious, but claimed that many were filed solely to line the pockets of the plain-
tiffs' lawyers.
30. See BRICKMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 21 (citing two mass disaster
cases in which top litigators concluded that there was no way the plaintiffs could
not recover; these were clear cases of innocent plaintiffs and liability on the part
of the defendants).
31. See Meier, supra note 1. See also BPJCKMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 55
n.24 (noting a case in Texas which resulted in a $122 million partial settlement
and yielded the attorneys over $40 million in legal fees despite the fact that
most attorneys did not participate in the settlement negotiations and very little
trial preparatory work had begun because of the high likelihood of settlement.
The hourly rate of these attorneys was roughly estimated at $25,000-$30,000 per
hour).
32. For an in depth look at class actions, see JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H.
TRANSGRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 530-701 (1998).
33. BRiCKMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 13.
34. See, e.g., Malcolm v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346 (2d. Cir. 1993).
In this case, 600 separate cases were consolidated into one action, with each
plaintiff naming between fourteen and forty-two defendants. The jury award
was over $94 million. Although the suit was eventually remanded for improper
consolidation, had it stood, the plaintiffs' lawyers would have collected over $30
million in legal fees.
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stems from the fact that contingency fees are based on a percent
scale rather than an absolute dollar amount. Consequently, if
one looks at the typical agreement which states that the attorney
is entitled to the thirty percent if they win, this does not seem
excessive. However, once the actual dollar figures are examined
in the multimillion, or now, multibillion, dollar judgments in
complex cases, such a fee appears obscene relative to the amount
of work done.
Some have argued that the legal system is a market just like
any other and, consequently, these multi-million dollar payouts
to attorneys are merely reflections of the legal market. If the
defendants honestly do not want to pay such fees, they should
not settle the cases for such high amounts, nor should the plain-
tiffs agree to give the attorneys such a high percent of the poten-
tial award. Moreover, as these increasingly complex cases come
to the fore, the lawyers are able to demand such high returns
because of the uncertainty of litigating such issues as tobacco or
asbestos, where for years, such cases were losers. In exchange for
promising the attorney such a large cut of the final pie, the client
receives the lawyer's expertise, time, and energy to litigate a risky
and complex case.
The problem with this "law as a market" argument is that it
completely destroys the long held belief of the ethical nature of
the legal profession; 5 it places the legal profession in the same
category as auto manufacturers, food producers, and the ciga-
rette industry-all of which are governed solely by market and
governmental pressures and which have no identifiable inherent
ethical standards of their own.
In response to the growing concerns, the A.B.A. and court
systems have revised their policies in order to regulate the rates.
As Professor Brickman noted:
Section 2-106(A) of the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility which barred 'clearly excessive fees', was
superseded by Rule 1.5(a) of the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. Rule 1.59(a)'s bar against 'unreasonable'
fees was expressly designed by the drafters of the Model
Rules to eliminate the term 'clearly excessive' and thereby
prohibit ... unreasonable as well as patently unconsciona-
ble fees.3 6
35. For an in depth debate on the inherently ethical nature of the legal
profession and the need to be independent from the pressures of the outside,
market-driven world, see SHAFFER, supra note 19, at 167-239.
36. BRIcKMAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 15.
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Moreover, the Model Rules, Ethical Consideration 5-7 notes that:
"Because the lawyer is in a better position to evaluate a cause of
action, [the lawyer] should enter the contingent fee arrange-
ment only in those instances where the arrangement will be ben-
eficial to the client."
3 7
Using these rules, the courts have attempted to regulate
excessive contingency fees. However, such judicial discretion is
limited almost entirely to cases which actually reach the trial
stage; for the vast majority of cases which settle, the courts have
very little power to reduce the fees paid to the attorneys unless
the defendant raises the issue, which is very rare as this concern
is often dealt with by the plaintiff attorney in settlement negotia-
tions. This is due primarily because settlement is considered a
two party contract, with which the courts should not interfere.
Consequently, when the courts have attempted to regulate the
fees in settlements, the regulated party simply pulls out of the
negotiations until such time as the opposing party capitulates
and withdraws its request for judicial interference.38 Again, this
brings up problems of the attorney's fiduciary duties to his client
as the attorney is now using his own interests as bargaining tools
to an otherwise acceptable offer.
An even more compelling weakness of the contingency fee
system is seen when attorneys begin calculating their fees by what
they will recover relative to the amount of work they put into a
given case. In addition to protracting the settlement process to
force high settlements which, in turn, allow for high contingency
fees, attorneys also have the option of seeking a quick settlement
in order to avoid expending the effort that a protracted trial or
heavily negotiated settlement requires. Consequently, the attor-
ney may receive what equates to an extremely high hourly wage
at the expense of his client's right to a higher recovery.3 9
To take a simple example which illustrates this point, if the
attorney puts in 100 hours of work and receives one-third of a
$200,000 settlement, he has, effectively earned $800 an hour for
his services, but if the attorney had negotiated harder or taken
the case to trial where the payout was $360,000, but he worked
400 hours in preparing the case for trial, his return would only
37. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-7 (1995).
Although Ethical Considerations are not mandatory, this Consideration in par-
ticular is indicative of the court's power to review contingency fees for abuse.
38. The exception to this is, of course, when an independent arbitrator
sets the fees as in the case of the Tobacco litigation, but even here, the attor-
neys would probably not agree to the arbitration without first calculating their
chances at a high recovery and high level of fees awarded.
39. See MACKINNON, supra note 20, at 198.
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be $300 per hour. Even accounting for a graduated increase in
the attorney's rate of return to fifty percent should the case go to
trial, the attorney's hourly rate is equal to $450 per hour, a signif-
icant difference from the $800 an hour had he settled early.
Moreover, this does not account for additional business which
the attorney could have taken on as a result of not having to
spend the long hours on this one particular case. It is apparent
from both situations-that of the attorney using his fee as a
heavy handed negotiating tool and, alternatively, using the settle-
ment process as a means of extracting exorbitant hourly fees
under the guise of a contingency fee, that the system is ripe for
abuse and that the system encourages the attorney to abandon
his fiduciary obligations to his client in favor of higher returns.
Related to these issues is the problem that although the
Model Rules and individual state bars have expressly forbidden
the use of contingency fees in cases where there is little or no risk
of nonpayment of fees,4" the reality has become that the contin-
gency fee is virtually the "exclusive method of compensating
attorneys in personal injury cases."'" Despite the rules governing
the types of cases which may employ contingency fees, it is
incredibly difficult for the courts to actually police these cases.4"
Usually those cases which are not contested and, consequently
the result is never in doubt, settle out of court, resulting in the
inability of the courts to monitor the fee system, whereas those
cases which actually do come before the court are usually those
in which settlement has broken down and a credible claim to the
uncertainty of the outcome can be made. Moreover, it is simply
impractical for the courts to police every case for its fee struc-
ture.4 3 Because of the general lack of enforcement of the rules
governing billing as well as the higher payout the contingency
fee provides, contingency fees have become the rule rather than
the exception in tort litigation.
40. See generally Yermakov v. Fitzsimmons, 718 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983);
Comm. on Prof I Ethics & Conduct v. McCullough, 468 N.W.2d 458 (Iowa
1990) (contingency fee upheld because of uncertainty of outcome of litiga-
tion); Thibaut, Thibaut, Garrett & Bacot v. Smith & Loveless, Inc., 576 So.2d
532 (La. App. 1990); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kemp, 496 A.2d 672, 678-
79 (Md. 1985); In re Hanna, 362 S.E.2d 632 (S.C. 1987).
41. Janet A. Laufer, Of Ethics and Economics: Contingent Fees for Legal Serv-
ices, 16 AKRON L. REV. 747, 747-48 (1983); see also BRicamAN ET AL., supra note
15, at 18.
42. See BRic'.mAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 19.
43. See id.
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II. THE ENGLISH RULE-LOSER PAYS
Given the aforementioned concerns regarding the contin-
gency fee system, a movement started in the late 1980s to actively
reform the American system and replace the contingency fee sys-
tem with a system similar to that seen in England. The English
Rule or "Loser Pays" is based on a simple premise-that the los-
ing party in any lawsuit must pay the reasonable costs and legal
fees of the opposing side.44
Although the political support in America for the English
Rule has slipped away since being actively raised in the late
1980s, due in part to the departure of its most ardent supporter,
Vice-President Quayle,45 from public office, the movement has
slowly regained ground to introduce the system to America.
Such support has come from both public and private quarters.46
Despite the congressional failure to approve a Loser Pays mea-
sure, private suits requesting reimbursement of fees and costs by
the loser are increasing. Most recently, a Springfield, Virginia
woman who had her brain-damaged husband's feeding tube
removed after it sustained him for three and one-half years is
seeking reimbursement for her legal costs and sanctions against
the state for challenging her authority. The woman, Michele
Finn, recently filed motions in Circuit Court over her legal costs
and for sanctions against Gov. Jim Gilmore and other state offi-
cials to deter the government from abusing its authority for their
own political agenda.47 The matter is still in litigation. Although
virtually unheard of twenty years ago, such suits for reimburse-
ment of not only court costs, but attorney fees, are gaining
momentum.
The Ethical Problems of the English Rule
Despite its simple premise and the seemingly positive result
of the suit's victor being vindicated and therefore not burdened
with large fees and costs resulting from an action which they
were either justified in bringing or of which they were unjustifi-
ably accused, the reality of the English Rule is far more complex
44. See Branham, supra note 6, at 973.
45. See KRITZER, supra note 12, at 1 n.1. Former Vice-President Quayle
actively promoted litigation reform and supported a proposal to impose the
Loser Pays system in Diversity cases filed in the federal court system. See PREsI-
DENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN
AMERICA (1991).
46. See THE REPUBLICAN PARTY, CONTRACT WITH AMERICA (1984).
47. Refund Sought in Right to Die Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1998, at Al.
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than merely having the loser pay the fees and costs of the win-
ning side.
The initial ethical problem with the system is that it affects
different classes of legal participants differently. Most tort
defendants are institutional-either corporations or insurance
companies48 and are actually expected to pay the costs if they
lose; they both have the assets and usually their budgets account
for future emergencies. Moreover, insurance companies are
designed to give payouts and budget accordingly.4" "An individ-
ual or small business with limited means, whether a plaintiff or
defendant, is likely to be more severely affected by the risk than a
well-heeled opponent, especially one who is a repeat player (such
as an insurance company) capable of spreading risk over a large
number of cases."5 ° Additionally, the rule is virtually meaning-
less to the very rich or corporate plaintiffs as they can afford the
risk of having to pay the opposing side in the event that they
lost.51 Likewise, it would not affect the very poor who qualify for
what limited legal aid America provides; this class of people has
few assets which could be seized to pay the opposing side in the
event that they lost. Therefore the negative effects of the Loser
Pays rule are limited to the middle and lower classes who do not
qualify for legal aid.
In contrast to America, England has- three primary mecha-
nisms which make the Loser Pays system feasible.52 First, Eng-
land has a system of legal insurance which is nonexistent in
America." Litigation insurance permits those who are involved
in lawsuits to mount strong cases without respect to costs. If they
lose, the litigant pays a portion of the costs, but most are picked
up by the insurance carrier. Consequently, this system protects
individuals from the dangers of filing suits which, while meritori-
ous, may not be guaranteed winners.5 4 Because of the inherent
48. KRITZER, supra note 12, at 3.
49. See Edward F. Sherman, From "Loser Pays" to Modified Offer of Judgment
Rules: Reconciling Incentives to Settle With Access to Justice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1863,
1882 (1998).
50. Id.
51. See Branham, supra note 6, at 975 (noting that because those rich
enough to litigate, whether individuals or corporations, would have a lethal
advantage in a Loser Pays system, the middle and lower classes are at a greater
risk of exploitation).
52. Note, however, that even in England, "for the ordinary citizen unqual-
ified for Legal Aid a lawsuit is quite out of the question." Herbert M. Kritzer,
Legal Fees: The English Rule, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1992, at 54, 55 (quoting PATRICK
DEVLIN, TEIE JUDGE 69 (1979)).
53. See id. at 55.
54. See id.
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risk of these types of suits, under the English rule and without
litigation insurance which helps minimize the risks involved if
one loses, these types of cases would never be filed. Although
some may argue that this has the positive effect of reducing litiga-
tion, it is extremely important to note that while reduction of
frivolous suits is desired, we do not want to discourage valid
claims from being brought simply because of their costs; every
person deserves their day in court.
Another mechanism widely unavailable in the United States,
but which is common in England is that of legal aid." Although
America has such programs, their scope is limited to the
extremely disadvantaged and is typically unavailable "for cases
which could be handled through contingent fees, and those
cases are the primary target for the loser pays rule."56 Conse-
quently, while twenty-eight percent of plaintiffs in England
receive legal aid,57 only those below the poverty line receive such
assistance in the United States.
Finally, about twenty-nine percent of English plaintiffs in
accident cases, including nonwork-related claims, receive legal
financial assistance from their trade unions.5" "Generally, unions
provide both legal representation for their members and absorb
litigation costs."5 In contrast, American unions rarely get
involved in litigation unless the claim is directly work related. As
a result of these mechanisms in England, the Loser Pays system
allows the average individual6" to bring valid claims, while incur-
ring only some of the risk of a suit (through insurance premiums,
having to pay a percentage of the legal costs based on a scale of
their earnings). As America has no such mitigating programs,
the burden of losing falls squarely on the shoulders of the aver-
age individual, thereby making it virtually impossible, economi-
cally speaking, to file a case.
A large problem of the Loser Pays system is that it does not
adequately address administrative issues. If the English system is
imported to America, it is unclear whether the losing party
should pay for those fees and costs incurred from litigating
motions and pleadings which it won during the process despite
55. See KRITZER, supra note 12, at 8.
56. Id.
57. See Kritzer, supra note 52, at 56.
58. See id.
59. Id.
60. However, even under this system, "about 40 percent of English plain-
tiffs are subject to the downside risk of the English Rule, according to a 1986
study conducted for the Lord Chancellor's Department, the management arm
of the English judiciary." Id. at 55.
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losing the final judgment. In England, although motions and
pleadings exist, they are not nearly as extensive as in America
and, consequently, the costs of these motions are not usually an
issue. "English courts, and therefore parties, lump all costs
together and look at them globally only at the end of the litiga-
tion."" In contrast, in America, the pretrial discovery process,
with its various filings, is extremely costly and time consuming.
Consequently, any Loser Pays system must adequately address
not only the final judgment, but also the costs of these intermedi-
ate procedures. Although failure to make or cooperate in discov-
ery is punishable by Rule 37 sanctions,62 these cases are reserved
for extreme cases of misconduct. The rule imposed by the Loser
Pays system would inevitably lead to further litigation as to the
adequacy of the motion; whether a motion which was filed was
actually necessary, was indulgent or intended just to burden the
opposing party with the motion's costs.
6 3
Likewise, it is equally unclear as to what constitutes a reason-
able amount to be paid to the other side. Although in England
there is "a well-established set of norms as to what various aspects
of legal representation should cost,"6 4 American jurisprudence
has given birth to a hugely varied level of fees. Issues such as
whether or not a single, flat rate should be instituted as opposed
to a variable rate based on the experience and skill of the attor-
ney or on the nature of the case, its riskiness and complexity65
are huge hurdles that must be overcome before any such system
can be implemented.
This gives rise to another problem. In England, disputed
fees are not handled by the courts. Instead, special taxing mas-
ters or registrars deal with fee disputes and make rulings on cost
shifting.66 Although these are roughly equivalent to magistrates
61. John Heaps & Kathryn Taylor, The Abuser Pays: The Control of Unwar-
ranted Discoveyy, 41 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 615 (1997); see also LoRD WOOLF, ACCESS
TO JUSTICE: INTERIM REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR ON THE CML JUSTICE
SYSTEM IN ENGLAND AND WALES (1995).
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
63. For example, certain discovery motions could be filed, which, while
technically winners in the sense that they release discoverable information and
therefore the opposing party must pay for the motion, are unnecessary as the
requesting party already has the information. It is not a stretch to imagine,
especially in complex litigation, lawyers using the discovery cost rule as a mech-
anism to burden the opposing party with multiple requests, motions, and plead-
ings, simply to increase costs upon the party.
64. KRITZER, supra note 12, at 2.
65. See id. at 14.
66. See Kritzer, supra note 52, at 58.
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or court commissioners67 in America, to argue that these com-
missioners or magistrates should handle these issues is unrealistic
as many magistrates are finding themselves backlogged with their
existing duties. Consequently, under such a system, either the
courts must assume the new role of policing fee disputes between
the parties or a new entity must be created, thereby further con-
tributing to the backlog and bureaucracy already seen in the
court system.
Just as in the contingency fee system, a fundamental ques-
tion must be addressed as to whether it is even appropriate for
courts to interfere with the rights of the two parties to negotiate
for certain costs and fees. If the case goes to trial, an argument
can be made that the courts have a strong public policy incentive
to regulate fees vis a vis the opposing parties in order to halt the
abuses currently seen, but if the case first settles, it is very difficult
to argue that the courts have a role in the cost shifting negotia-
tions which take place; if the courts attempt to curb frivolous
suits by using, as one mechanism, the controls on costs and fees,
this automatically reduces the leeway given to the parties to set-
tle-they simply do not have the negotiating power which they
currently have. On the other hand, if the courts do not play a
role in the settlement process out of deference to the parties'
freedom to negotiate, the entire rationale for having the English
Rule crumbles as most frivolous lawsuits are filed based on calcu-
lations as to the chances of settlement before the courts even
become involved.
Another fundamental issue is whether the Loser Pays system
would have any effect on frivolous suits. If it would not, then it
should not be adopted given the aforementioned concerns. If it
would reduce the frivolous suits, then the question becomes
whether the reduction of frivolous suits justifies the loss of legal
recourse which is currently available to the middle and lower
classes.
Although the Loser Pays system has found great support
among those who wish to abolish frivolous suits and reduce the
overall level of litigation,68 it appears that the Loser Pays system is
not a sound means to accomplish this goal in America. As Amy
Farmer and Paul Pecorino noted:
The theoretical literature to date does not lend strong sup-
port to the use of the English rule as a means of reducing
costs associated with nuisance suits. In the Katz (1990)
model of nuisance suits, total litigation costs are invariant
67. See id.
68. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, supra note 45.
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to the use of the English rule. His is a screening model in
which the uninformed defendant makes a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to an informed plaintiff. Ex ante, the defendant can-
not distinguish plaintiffs who are legitimately injured from
those who are filing nuisance suits. The defendant must
trade off the cost of settling nuisance suits against the cost
of taking legitimate cases to trial. In equilibrium, the
defendant uses a mixed strategy under which plaintiffs
receive a hard offer of zero with some probability.69
It is clear that the heart of the frivolous lawsuit is the settle-
ment process. No attorney in his right mind would file a suit
which he knows he would lose at trial if he did not believe he
could first settle. Consequently any system which seeks to reduce
these frivolous suits must necessarily address settlement issues
and it is highly debatable whether the English Rule would have
any such effect. "There has been much debate in the law and
economics literature over the effect of fee shifting rules on settle-
ment. Richard A. Posner and Steven Shavell have concluded that
fee shifting of the English 'loser pays' type would decrease the
likelihood of settlement."7 Others, such as Keith Hylton, have
found that "[t]he incentive to litigate rather than to settle a dis-
pute is greater under the British than under the American
rule."7 From the wide range of theories regarding the effects of
Loser Pays on the settlement process, such as Posner's view that it
would reduce settlement to John Donohue's view that settlement
rates would be largely unchanged,7 2 perhaps the most that can
69. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, A Reputation For Being a Nuisance: Frivo-
lous Lawsuits and Fee Shifting in a Repeated Play Game, 18 INr'L REv. L. & EcoN.
147, 148 (1998). In this article, Farmer gives an in depth explanation of the
Katz model.
70. Sherman, supra note 49, at 1869; but seeJohnJ. Donohue III, Optingfor
the British Rule, or if Posner and Shavell Can't Remember the Coase Theorem, Who
Will?, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1093, 1099 (1991) (presenting a model showing that
the settlement rate would be identical under the American and British rules
and arguing that Posner and Shavell failed to consider the Coase theorem).
71. See Sherman, supra note 49, at 1869; see also Keith N. Hylton, Fee Shift-
ing and Predictability of Law, 71 CHI.-KErr L. REv. 427, 444-45 (1995). Conse-
quently, those individuals or corporations which are more able to sustain a
protracted trial and are therefore more likely to call the opponent's bluff, are
typically not sued under the English Rule. However, Hylton's argument is weak
in this regard as it appears that the same can be said for the current American
system whereby those with more resources and who have a reputation for not
settling are typically not subjected to frivolous suits as those attorneys know that
their case would never survive a trial.
72. SeeJohn J. Donohue III, The Effects of Fee Shifting on the Settlement Rate:
Theoretical Observations on Costs, Conflicts, and Contingency Fees, 54 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 195, 222 (1991).
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be said of the effects of Loser Pays on settlement is that the data
is unclear. Consequently, it would be somewhat hasty to adopt
such a radical revision of the fee system until more is known
about the effects of it on settlement.
Moreover, there is no real need to even pursue that line of
inquiry. If the Loser Pays system had some effect on frivolous
suits as its proponents claim, it must also have an effect on meri-
torious suits for similar reasons. Just as with frivolous claims
where the plaintiff would supposedly be discouraged from filing
a suit due to the sanctions of having to pay the other side's costs
and fees, the same threat is equally discouraging to potential
plaintiffs seeking to file meritorious claims: most individuals are
averse to paying an hourly fee of at least one hundred dollars to
their own lawyer in the event they lost, (although in these losing
situations, most lawyers would probably not collect), but to have
to pay the opposing side's legal costs as well could be so damag-
ing that the possibility, however small, of losing would be enough
of a deterrent to filing an otherwise meritorious claim.
This fundamental problem with the Loser Pays system could
possibly be overcome if the procedural safeguards seen in Eng-
land are implemented here. If the system is implemented with-
out an expansion of legal insurance, legal aid or union support,
legal representation will become unavailable to most Americans
due to the increased financial burdens on them. Although an
argument can be made that the current system, with its low finan-
cial risks, fosters unnecessary litigation and a mentality of "I've
been hurt, who can I sue,"7 3 the alternative provided by the Eng-
lish Rule goes to the other extreme whereby individuals with a
valid grievance have no recourse. Because our legal system was
founded on the belief that every individual is entitled to his or
her day in court,"4 such a system that prevents legal recourse
solely because of low or even moderate economic means would
be anathema. However, expanding legal aid and legal insurance
as well as forcing the already overly bureaucratic unions into the
world of individual suits would only complicate matters as the
unions and insurance companies would want to participate in
the proceedings to ensure proper management of the funds.
The end result of this would be a potential loss of autonomy by
the very plaintiffs we are seeking to protect as these third parties
73. In the television show Ally McBea one exaggerated character's philos-
ophy of life is, "If you don't like the way you've been treated, sue." Although a
facetious show, it well represents an increasingly common attitude among some
in our society who have come to view the legal system as a mechanism created
solely to provide them with personal wealth from real or imaginary grievances.
74. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-62 (1989).
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with a vested interest in the outcome of the case would want to
dictate which attorneys are hired and would demand significant
say in the trial and settlement strategies.
Besides the administrative and social differences between
England and America which would make it difficult to institute
the English Rule here, it does not even appear that the English
Rule is working well in England.75 Despite the institutional safe-
guards in England:
[T] he costs of litigation in England are now so high that
[e]xcessive cost[s] deter people from making or defending
claims. A number of businesses [say] that it is often
cheaper to pay up, irrespective of the merits, than to
defend an action. For individual litigants the unaffordable
cost of litigation constitutes a denial of access to justice. 76
Not only does such a system affect the defendant's desire to
settle, but it has also created the strong incentive on the part of
plaintiffs to take whatever settlement offer is made in order to
avoid the risk of huge costs. 7 7 Consequently, a prospective liti-
gant must calculate whether he can afford, either as plaintiff or
defendant, to actively litigate a claim in the first place, rather
than settling for the sum proposed by the other side. From the
standpoint of viewing the legal process as a mechanism forjustice
rather than a financial transaction of offer and acceptance, such
incentives cannot be palatable, no matter how much we want to
encourage settlement.
Finally, under the Loser Pays Rule, the costs of litigation are
now generally higher in Britain than anywhere else except, possi-
bly, the state of California. 78 As one company noted, "the cost of
defending UK litigation, paid by our professional indemnity
insurers, now exceeds our annual budget for training and devel-
opment. '79 All of these concerns have translated in a move by
the current government to reform the system and significantly
modify, if not abolish the Loser Pays Rule in England.
III. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS TO BALANCING FRrVOLOUS SUITS
WITH MERITORIOUS CLAIMS
Despite general hostility in America to the Loser Pays sys-
tem, the system exists in some states, albeit in a modified form.
Alaska, for example, has a modified Loser Pays system in their
75. See generally Heaps & Taylor, supra note 61.
76. Id. at 616.
77. See Kritzer, supra note 52, at 56.
78. See Heaps & Taylor, supra note 61, at 617.
79. Id. at n.7.
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Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 82.8" This Rule shifts the costs
and fees of the prevailing party to the losing party based on a set
schedule determined by the amount of judgment and prejudg-
ment interest and on whether or not the case went to trial.8 ' The
courts have some leeway in setting these fees based on eleven
factors, but if the amount varies from the statutory schedule, the
court is required to outline which factors caused the discrep-
ancy. 2 These factors are:
(A) the complexity of the litigation;
(B) the length of trial;
(C) the reasonableness of the attorneys' hourly rates and
the number of hours expended;
(D) the reasonableness of the number of attorneys used;
(E) the attorneys' efforts to minimize fees;
(F) the reasonableness of the claims and defenses pur-
sued by each side;
(G) vexatious or bad faith conduct;
(H) the relationship between the amount of work per-
formed and the significance of the matters at stake;
(I) the extent to which a given fee award may be so oner-
ous to the non-prevailing party that it would deter
similarly situated litigants from the voluntary use of
the courts;
(J) the extent to which the fees incurred by the prevail-
ing party suggest that they had been influenced by
considerations apart from the case at bar, such as a
desire to discourage claims by others against the pre-
vailing party or its insurer; and
(K) other equitable factors deemed relevant.8 "
Although the results of the system have been mixed, it is
generally agreed that this system does not reduce frivolous
claims.8 4 Some claim that because the court has discretion in
awarding fees based on the above factors, including the reasona-
bleness of the claims and bad faith, it allows for greater manage-
ment of these frivolous claims. Others, however, claim that
although the judges technically have the freedom to limit fees, it
is very difficult to prove bad faith as most lawyers would ensure
during the settlement process that such claims will not be
80. ALAsKA R. Crv. P. 82.
81. Id. See also Branham, supra note 6, at 975.
82. See supra note 80.
83. Id.
84. See Branham, supra note 6, at 975; see also Di Pietro & Cams, supra
note 7, at 43 (noting that in a survey of Alaskan lawyers, no consensus existed as
to Rule 82's effectiveness or benefits).
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brought by the opposing side. Even if the Alaska Rule does
reduce frivolous suits, we are still forced to balance the decrease
in frivolous suits with the basic concerns seen in the English
Rule: just as under the English Rule, the increasing costs of liti-
gation are making the Alaska Rule prohibitive for the average
person to file a suit.85
Another permutation of the Loser Pays system is that pro-
posed by Judge William Schwarzer. Under the Schwarzer plan,
either party may propose a settlement.86 If the offer is refused
and the opposing side is unable to obtain a better judgment, the
offeror would be entitled to recover its reasonable attorney's
fees. While this proposal is supported by many in the legal com-
munity as it encourages early settlement, it faces two sharp criti-
cisms. First, the plan fails to address those frivolous suits which
are filed solely with the intention of inducing the opposing side
to settle early. In these circumstances, Schwarzer's system is inap-
plicable because the plaintiff's attorney will accept the settlement
offer rather than allow the frivolous case to go forward which
could subject himself to possible sanctions for filing the frivolous
suit. A second concern is that such a proposal encourages settle-
ment so early that proper discovery has not been allowed. This is
best exemplified by a proposal several years ago by the National
Association of Securities Dealers which would have required an
investor subject to arbitration to pay the court costs and fees-
including attorneys fees-if the later arbitration award was less
than the earlier settlement offer.8v The primary concern with
the proposal was that it encouraged settlement so early in the
process that neither side had the benefit of discovery proceed-
ings on which to make a rational decision on how to proceed. 8
Because the Schwarzer proposal is very similar to the NASD plan,
this discovery issue must be addressed before it is implemented.
Rules 11 and 3 7
Before analyzing how the current system should be over-
hauled given its current abuses, it is first necessary to examine
the enforcement mechanisms already in place and to determine
if, by approaching them in a different manner, an overhaul is
even necessary. For example, Rule 11 already exists to deal with
85. See Di Pietro & Carns, supra note 7, at 44.
86. See Stuart Taylor, Jr., Attacking Legal Waste in Bill Clinton's Washington,
AM. LAw., May 1993, at 6-7.
87. See Michael Siconolfi, NASD Withdraws 'Loser Pays' Arbitration Proposal,
WALL ST. J., July 6, 1994, at Cl.
88. See id.
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frivolous suits. However, the bar for what constitutes a Rule 11
violation is currently very high and the fee-shifting mechanism of
the Rule is used only in limited circumstances.8 9 Should this bar
be lowered and the fee shifting mechanism be utilized more fre-
quently, a complete overhaul may not be necessary.
Currently, Rule 11 requires an attorney to certify in his
pleadings that to the best of his knowledge the suit or motion has
not been presented for any improper purpose, is well grounded
in fact, and is "warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argu-
ment for the extension, modification or reversal of existing
law."9" If the court determines that this Rule was violated, it may,
either sua sponte or upon a motion, impose on the offending
party a sanction which may "include an order to pay the other
party or parties the amount of the expenses incurred as a result
of the violation, including reasonable attorney's fees."9 1 How-
ever, such fee-shifting is seen as the exception rather than the
rule and is only used in cases requiring an effective deterrent.9 2
The Rule purports to establish an objective standard,
"intended to eliminate any empty-head pure-heart justification
for patently frivolous arguments."" However, in establishing this
objective standard, the Rule must necessarily allow for arguments
for a change in law and new theories of law. Consequently,
despite the Rule's modified language to include a "good faith
clause,"94 courts simply "cannot know how likely the plaintiff
thought its suit was to succeed at trial."9 5 As a result, the Rule's
value for deterrence is minimal except in the most egregious
cases; Rule 1 I's current good faith standard leaves open the issue
of what constitutes a frivolous case. If Rule 11 is to be applied
more rigorously, the burden of proving bad f," :h must necessar-
ily be lessened.
Reducing the burden of proving bad faith, however, would
not be beneficial to our legal system. Under the current system,
if good faith is shown, the inclination is to avoid fee shifting in
order to protect everyone's right to a day in court and to protect
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
90. LucIAN AYE BEBCHUCK & HowARD F. CHANG, An Analysis of Fee-Shift-
ing Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and
the Role of Rule 11 (National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. ed., 1994); see
also id. at n.9 (noting recent amendments to Rule 11 include a "good faith"
clause).
91. Id.
92. FED. R. Crv. P. 11 (c)(2).
93. Id. advisory committee's notes.
94. Id.
95. BEBCHUCK & CHANG, supra note 90, at 27.
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the entrepreneurial bar seen in America.96 In England, the
Loser Pays rule discourages suits which "advance unique legal
theories or new causes of action, and thus might dampen this
aspect of the entrepreneurial style of the plaintiff's bar.""7
Imposing harsher sanctions on attorneys through Rule 11 would
further undermine this spirit. This would have a detrimental
effect on many new, cutting-edge legal practices. The newly
developing field of Cyber-litigation for example, relies heavily on
attorneys taking cases with little or no precedent and promoting
new theories to match the changing technology. Copyright
infringement on the Internet is becoming increasingly common,
yet existing law does not adequately address these problems.
Many attorneys are taking these cases, believing that they are act-
ing in good faith, but also knowing the financial risks due to the
uncertain status of the law in this field. If the Rule 11 bar is low-
ered so that the courts are more likely to impose Rule 11 sanc-
tions in cases with little precedent or, as opposing counsel may
term them, "frivolous cases," these attorneys are much less likely
to take these new and important cases.
In addition to deterring cutting edge cases through financial
sanctions, Rule 11 sanctions also create a professional stigma not
present under either the Loser Pays or the contingency fee sys-
tem. Unlike Loser Pays or the contingency fee system, if the
attorney loses, the only penalties he incurs are financial, but if he
loses in a Rule 11 proceeding, he loses a substantial part of his
professional reputation. Any attorney who is slapped with a Rule
11 sanction is looked upon by his colleagues as someone less
than honorable; someone who broke the rules. As a result, the
bar for imposing Rule 11 sanctions is and should be extremely
high and reserved only for the most egregious cases. Therefore,
while lowering the Rule 11 bar would have the desired effect of
deterring the less egregious, but nonetheless frivolous cases, it
would also probably deter many nonfrivolous, good faith cases
which might be either cutting edge or without much precedent,
but which are valid nonetheless.
Another existing mechanism is Rule 37.98 Rule 37 is used to
compel discovery and then sanction those who do not comply. If
the motion to compel is frivolous, the court may authorize the
moving party to pay the opposing side's costs in opposing the
96. See KRITZER, supra note 12, at 11. Professor Kritzer claims that a signif-
icant difference between the English legal system and the American system is
that the American system fosters a more entrepreneurial bar, whereas the Eng-
lish system is typically reluctant to expand into new areas of practice.
97. Id.
98. FED. R. Cny. P. 37.
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motion.99 Just as with Rule 11, however, a determination
whether the motion is frivolous is predicated on a finding of a
lack of good faith by the moving party. Again, however, because
courts are hesitant to discourage relevant motions, the bar for
good faith is low. Consequently, its deterrence effect is minimal.
If that bar is raised, then Rule 37 may become more effective at
preventing frivolous suits, but it will also deter certain meritori-
ous claims.
IV. PROPOSAL
In designing a new fee system, we can never lose sight of our
goal: "to induce plaintiffs to sue if and only if they are entitled to
prevail at trial."'100 Moreover, several important issues must be
taken into account. First, the system must create the proper
incentives to allow people with valid claims to file suits while dis-
suading those with frivolous suits. To force those with valid suits
but which, for whatever reason, lose, to pay the same penalties as
those who file frivolous suits (i.e. paying the costs of the oppos-
ing side) would defeat the very purpose of trying to encourage
these meritorious suits. Second, the plan must take into account
the differing incentives at the different stages of the proceedings.
Schwarzer's proposal, for example, while addressing frivolous
suits at the trial stage has no real solution for frivolous suits filed
with the intent of forcing a settlement. Third, the certainty of
the outcome is crucial to which path one takes.1 '
The following proposal combines the best of the Loser Pays
system and the contingency fee system, thereby reducing frivo-
lous suits while still encouraging those with meritorious suits to
proceed. This system does not discourage friv.-ous suits through
financial penalties, but instead, uses the institutional mecha-
nisms of settlement and trial to discourage suits and preventing
frivolous suits from settling before going to trial. Finally, this
proposal takes account of the certainty of certain claims and the
incentives this has on whether to file, settle or go forward to trial.
This proposal is based on a two-tiered approach to fees,
rather than a one-tiered system seen in both the contingency fee
and Loser Pays systems. The first tier addresses those cases which
never make it to trial. These cases which settle in the discovery
or pre-discovery phase of a trial are billed at an hourly rate, simi-
lar to current transactions. The caveat to this is that if no settle-
ment is reached, then the lawyer does not collect even his hourly
99. See id.
100. BEBCHUCK & CHANG, supra note 90, at 1.
101. For a discussion on the role of certainty in litigation, see id. at 6-12.
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rate. However, once the case reaches trial, it enters the second
tier of billing. Even if it settles during this time, the case
becomes subject to a contingency fee and the hourly rate
becomes moot.
This has several benefits. First, this would discourage those
who file frivolous suits solely to gain huge settlements. Because
the large contingency fees will not exist in pretrial settlement,
the settlements should be smaller. Moreover, because the attor-
ney who files frivolous suits would only be able to collect based
on the amount of hourly work done, his incentive to file the suit
is greatly diminished; the only way to collect the high contin-
gency fee is to have the case actually go to trial and hope he can
settle it during the trial. This in-trial settlement would be virtu-
ally impossible if the case is a loser to begin with because now the
defendants, who may have settled previously to avoid negative
publicity, the hassle of trial etc., no longer have this incentive.
From the defendant's perspective, this proposal is appealing
on several levels. First, the number of frivolous suits would
decrease for the reasons discussed above. Second, the settlement
amount should be lower as lawyers, when negotiating, take into
account the high contingency fees. While the hourly fee will be
taken into account, it should not be as high as the contingency
fee. Third, under a Loser Pays system, the plaintiffs are often
insolvent or, at least unable to pay the total fees. Consequently,
it is impossible for the defendant, who is typically a corporation,
to collect the legal fees should the defendants win. Should the
defendant lose, however, because they do have the assets to pay
the fees, they almost always have to pay, resulting in a disparate
treatment of defendants and plaintiffs. This system does away
with this disparity as each side must take care of their own fees
out of whatever settlement or judgment there is.
The key, however, is not to make this system too defendant-
friendly at the expense of those meritorious suits; the interests of
both the defendant (protecting him from frivolous suits) and the
plaintiff (allowing meritorious suits to go forward) must be given
equal weight. Therefore, not only does this two-tiered system dis-
courage frivolous suits and lower settlement amounts, but it also
has the positive result of encouraging meritorious suits. If the
case settles prior to trial, the plaintiff has to pay the lawyer the
hourly rate out of the judgment, just as she does now, but unlike
the Loser Pays system, if the case does not settle and is simply
dropped, her attorney does not receive anything and so, the
plaintiff is no worse off than before. Consequently, the negative
impact of the Loser Pays system is mitigated as middle class and
lower class plaintiffs can still afford suits.
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This also forces the attorney to be more selective in choos-
ing the cases and also more aggressive for his client during settle-
ment negotiations. However, because the amount which the
lawyer will recover in settlement is not tied to the amount recov-
ered, we do not have the ethical dilemma currently seen of the
attorney becoming a financially interested party. To be sure, the
attorney still has an interest in having a positive result for his
client, but this will always be the case as any advocate would
always want his client to win; if not for financial reasons, for his
own prestige and repeat business by the client.
Two criticisms of this system can be made, both dealing with
the effects on meritorious suits. First, there is a risk that meritori-
ous suits will be affected because the attorneys become more
selective and, as a result, marginal suits will not be taken on.
This would certainly echo Professor Kritzer's fear that the Loser
Pays system discourages the entrepreneurial bar of America.
However, this fear is unfounded as it comes from a misguided
view as to the purpose of the legal system.
In every claim, no matter how meritorious, there is some risk
of losing. Currently, our system promotes the idea that the attor-
ney must bear the brunt of this risk through not collecting the
fee should he lose and, if he gambles in risky cases, he also reaps
the rewards of high returns. This may be a valid view. But the
basis of this view stems from the belief that the attorney should
bear the risks and rewards because it is he, based on his skill and
expertise, who must make the professional judgment as to
whether or not the case is viable. What the contingency system
has done, however, is to shift that professional burden away from
the legal merits of the case and toward whethe, or not the case is
of a particular type-emotionally charged or high profile, but
with few legal merits-and whether the defendant is particularly
settlement minded-wants to avoid negative publicity and is will-
ing to payout a large settlement to avoid such publicity. Thus,
many of these suits that we currently deem meritorious simply
because they settle or win at trial for whatever reason (e.g. emo-
tionally charged) are actually not legally meritorious at all; they
merely fall into a particular category of special settlement-
minded cases with little legal foundation. Under this proposal,
without the large payouts and the very real risk of nonpayment if
the case does not settle, the lawyer must now return to the merits
of the case to evaluate their potential.
Alternatively, a modification can be made which alleviates
the fear of discouraging meritorious suits. Rather than requiring
that the attorney not recover anything if the case collapses, the
attorney and client can formulate a fee schedule not to exceed X
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number of dollars. 10 2 In this agreement, however, the attorney
would commit that if the fees began to exceed the agreed on
amount, he would continue to act in good faith in negotiations
or trial preparatory work unless he genuinely believed the case
was a loser. The A.B.A. and Federal Rules could further imple-
ment guidelines on how to sanction attorneys who violate this
good faith clause. This system would then allow the attorney to
take the more marginal cases with an expectation of at least some
compensation. However, it must be explicit that the attorney
must act in good faith in these cases and cannot simply take on
frivolous cases, knowing that he will drop them eventually after
reaching the maximum.
The second negative aspect of this proposal could be that it
may discourage settlement on meritorious cases because attor-
neys want to take the case to trial in order to bump up their fees
to the contingency level. It is at this point that we institute the
Schwarzer Rule. If, after discovery, a settlement offer is proposed
and is refused because the plaintiff wants to take the case to trial
for higher attorney fees and then gets a lower judgment, then he
is forced to pay the opposing side's fees and costs. This should,
in most cases of a reasonable settlement offer, deter such con-
duct. Moreover, if the attorney refuses to take the offer solely
because of his desire for contingency fees, without consulting his
client, he could be held in violation of the Rules of Ethics. 0 3
The final component of this proposal is that the courts and
arbitration panels must be given some leeway in setting fee caps
for the multimillion dollar complex cases to avoid the egregious
$30,000-$40,000 an hour payouts. A good benchmark of what
constitutes reasonable payouts are those criteria outlined by the
Alaskan system. 10 4 This is not to say that the courts must go into
the fees of every case before them, because, as noted above, the
administrative costs of this would be prohibitive, but should a fee
dispute arise or, be egregious on its face, in the case of a $30,000
an hour payout, the courts should have the sua sponte power to
examine the fee agreement and lower it if necessary.
102. Just as courts and the A.B.A. have set caps on contingency fees, so
too could these entities establish a fee schedule based on the stage of settle-
ment. For more on A.B.A. regulation of contingency fees, see BRICKMAN ET AL.,
supra note 15, at 17-19.
103. Although neither the Model Rules nor-the Model Code require that
the plaintiff solicit a settlement offer, they do require that if an offer is made,
the attorney must consult with his client before accepting or rejecting such an
offer. See MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ ET AL., PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 136 (4th
ed. 1997).
104. See supra note 80.
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CONCLUSION
It is apparent that the existing contingency fee system
encourages frivolous lawsuits and, as such, must be amended.
Moreover, the contingency fee system has fundamentally altered
the relationship between attorney and client, resulting in dis-
trust, the loss of respect for the law, and the perception by law-
yers and the general populace alike that the legal profession is
simply ajob like any other without any higher ethical calling. It
is also apparent that the Loser Pays system is no better. At best,
the data on whether such a system will reduce frivolous suits is
inconclusive, while it is clear that such a system destroys the abil-
ity of many middle and lower income people from filing merito-
rious suits. Such a system would be intolerable in America where
we believe that every person is entitled to their day in court if
they have been wronged. Although we want to abolish frivolous
lawsuits which cost our system and individuals time and money, it
cannot be at the expense of a particular class's right to proper
representation.
The proposed system addresses the problems faced by plain-
tiffs, defendants and the judicial system as a whole. The system
permits only an hourly fee until trial. This actively discourages
frivolous suits that are brought solely to settle before the merits
of the case can be actually tried. Because the high returns to the
lawyers are seen only if the case goes to trial, these lawyers no
longer have the incentive to file the case, knowing that either the
payout is no longer there or that their case would not survive the
scrutiny of the courts where the high payouts do exist.
Moreover, this system also allows for meritorious suits to be
filed. Under both the original proposal of the attorney not col-
lecting the fee or under the modified system with a fee cap in the
event the case dissolves, the burden on the losing plaintiff is min-
imized. To be sure, there is some risk, but litigation is never risk
free; the key is to ensure that the risk is not prohibitive. Addi-
tionally, unlike the Loser Pays system, this system protects those
who file meritorious cases, but who end up losing for other rea-
sons, from being forced to pay the high costs of the opposing
side.
From the defendant's perspective, this system is also benefi-
cial. Not only should settlement amounts be lower as the attor-
ney's fees are not tied to the amount settled for, but this system
protects those corporate defendants who are now being viewed
as cashcows by contingency lawyers because of their propensity to
settle early and often for high amounts.
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Under the proposed system, the ethical problems seen in
the early, crucial stages of the proceedings, of the attorney hav-
ing a vested interest in the outcome, while not completely obvi-
ated, have been marginalized. Also, because the incentives to
settle early, in the form of contingency fees, have disappeared,
this system now encourages the attorney to focus on the case's
merits to decide whether to risk the now greater likelihood of a
trial. Finally, because of the Schwarzer Rule, unlike the current
system, this proposal actually encourages the attorney to ensure
that his client makes an informed decision. The attorney now
has an incentive to make sure that he carefully weighs his case's
chances of not only winning at trial, but for a higher amount
than the settlement offer. This system therefore benefits plain-
tiffs and defendants alike, while maintaining the ethical practices
of the profession and returning some of the moral obligations to
the individual lawyers.

